Recipe Index

All twenty-four recipes, alphabetical. The cookbook reordered for lookup.

1. § 3.5 Cross-Chain Primitives pg 59

   Validator-committee bridge in Phase 1. Symmetric ZK light clients the destination. The part of the project most likely to take longer than projected.

2. § 2.4 Durability Across Cryptographic Regime Change pg 35

   Three-phase migration with re-attestation primitives. Phase 1 in production today. Phase 3 the destination. No one-day cutover.

3. § 2.3 Fairness as Protocol-Level Ordering pg 31

   Threshold-encrypted mempool. Front-running, sandwiching, and selective reordering are not available, by construction.

4. § 5.2 Immutable in Code pg 91

   Immutable on paper is a charter article. Immutable in code is a smart contract with no admin function. The cost of forking is the cost of the credibility being abandoned.

5. § 3.4 MEV-Resistant Ordering pg 56

   The simplest possible fair-ordering rule and the one easiest to specify in a hostile environment. Sophistication is a future research item, not a launch dependency.

6. § 5.4 Narrow Surface Area pg 100

   Immutable code is unfixable code. The mitigations are formal verification, narrow surface, third-party audits, and a published incident response that includes forking the chain as the unhappy-path option.

7. § 4.6 Parameter Table pg 84

   The reference parameter table for the GCSR. The numbers in code, the bounds governance cannot cross, and the criteria each phase transition is gated on.

8. § 6.4 Per-Jurisdiction Notes pg 120

   Per-jurisdiction notes for the U.S., EU, UK, Singapore, and the emerging G20 perimeter. The starting point for in-venue counsel, not the destination.

9. § 4.5 Phased Launch pg 80

   Cap and ratio constraints in early phases, relaxing as observable stability criteria are met. Not gated on governance discretion.

10. § 2.2 Privacy as a Property of the Stack pg 27

    Privacy is the holder’s control of disclosure, sized to the verification need. Shielded by default, view-key scoped, ZK-attested. There is no master key.

11. § 3.2 Proof Systems pg 47

    The proof-system migration is the most user-visible part of the cryptographic migration. The strategy: make it mechanical for the holder.

12. § 6.5 Re-attestation Under Primitive Change pg 124

    Without re-attestation, the migration costs every holder a re-issuance event. With it, the migration is mechanical for everyone except the validators running it.

13. § 3.1 Signatures pg 42

    Aggregate validator signatures and account-level signatures, with a hybrid construction in Phase 2 and post-quantum destinations in Phase 3. The hardest single migration is validator-consensus aggregation.

14. § 2.1 Stability as a Credible Commitment pg 24

    Stability is not a state. Stability is a credible commitment to deploy increasingly aggressive defensive measures as conditions deteriorate — enforced by code, not by foundation policy.

15. § 4.3 The 130% Floor pg 73

    130% minimum collateral ratio in code. Steady-state target is 150%. The 20-point gap is the buffer Layer 2 operates in.

16. § 4.2 The 15% Cap pg 70

    No more than 15% of total backing collateral may be SZK. Enforced in code at the issuance layer. Cannot be raised by governance.

17. § 4.4 The Bounded-Dilution Proof pg 75

    Worst-case bound under stated assumptions: SZK to zero, 50% drawdown across exogenous collateral, dilution to the cap. 56.25% recovery on szUSD.

18. § 4.1 The Five-Layer Ladder pg 64

    Over-collateralization, algorithmic adjustment, emergency facilities, dilutive backstop, resolution waterfall. Conditions and responses enforced in code.

19. § 6.1 The View-Key Model pg 106

    Scoped view keys derived hierarchically. The protocol cannot disclose what the holder has not authorized. KDF migrates to PQ-resistant primitives in Phase 3.

20. § 6.3 The Warrant Model pg 117

    The same model existing financial regulation operates under. The bank knows its customers. The regulator subpoenas the bank, not the dollar.

21. § 5.1 Three Asset Classes pg 88

    A bank capital stack reframed in protocol form. The szBOND instrument exists in part so szUSD does not have to be the first absorber.

22. § 3.3 Threshold Encryption pg 53

    Transactions encrypted to a t-of-n threshold of validators. Decryption shares released only after ordering is finalized. The operational difference between a chain that has MEV and one that does not.

23. § 5.3 What Governance Can and Cannot Touch pg 95

    Governance can change parameters within published bounds. Governance cannot change the order of the waterfall, the 15% cap, the 130% floor, or the bounded-dilution math.

24. § 6.2 ZK Compliance Attestations pg 111

    Source-of-funds, sanctions-list non-membership, jurisdiction, threshold attestations. The chapter where the privacy/compliance binary collapses.

If you want the recipes in reading order instead of alphabetical, the preface lists them by chapter.