The Regulatory Perimeter
5 recipes.
The privacy/compliance binary is the wrong binary. Default privacy at the protocol layer and selective disclosure under holder authorization are the same architecture. View keys are the holder's. Compliance attestations prove the property without disclosing the state. The warrant power that already exists against regulated counterparties produces the disclosure the regulator needs. The protocol does not have a master key and does not need one.
This chapter is design, not legal opinion. The per-jurisdiction notes in § 6.4 are intended to be the starting point for in-venue counsel.
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Scoped view keys derived hierarchically. The protocol cannot disclose what the holder has not authorized. KDF migrates to PQ-resistant primitives in Phase 3.
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Source-of-funds, sanctions-list non-membership, jurisdiction, threshold attestations. The chapter where the privacy/compliance binary collapses.
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The same model existing financial regulation operates under. The bank knows its customers. The regulator subpoenas the bank, not the dollar.
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Per-jurisdiction notes for the U.S., EU, UK, Singapore, and the emerging G20 perimeter. The starting point for in-venue counsel, not the destination.
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Without re-attestation, the migration costs every holder a re-issuance event. With it, the migration is mechanical for everyone except the validators running it.
The pre-cryptographic constraint — that verifying a property required disclosing the underlying state — collapsed with production-ready zero-knowledge proofs. Most of the existing privacy/compliance debate is unaware of the collapse. Anyone who tells you privacy and compliance are at war is selling you something.